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Age and Gender Effects on Time Discounting in a Large Scale Cash 
Transfer Programme 
 
Bruno Martorano, Sudhanshu Handa, Carolyn Halpern, Audrey Pettifor  
and Harsha Thirumurthy 
 
Summary  
Inter-temporal choice represents one of the most fascinating topics in economics. 
Understanding its determinants can provide vital insight into decisions ranging from savings 
and financial investment to smoking, obesity and human capital accumulation. This article 
contributes to a growing literature that seeks to identify the determinants of inter-temporal 
choice. We explore the role of income shocks, age and gender on time discounting using 
evaluation data from the Government of Kenya’s largest social protection programme, the 
Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC). Study participants 
were randomised to treatment and control arms in 2007 and data on time discounting was 
collected on participants four years after programme inception. Our paper confirms that 
middle-aged groups are more patient than younger and older adults. In contrast to the 
empirical evidence, females are less patient than males and this situation is more evident 
during young and adult life. Males lose their patient during old age. Considering the impact of 
the programme, the average treatment effect of the programme on time discounting is 
negligible. However, it varies strongly with age of the recipient, with large and statistically 
significant effects among prime-age recipients and no effects on younger or older recipients. 
Moreover, these results are stronger for females than males, an important result given that 
over 60 per cent of recipients in target households are females.  
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Introduction 
Time preference, the disposition of individuals to delay gratification, has long captured the 
interest of social scientists due to its perceived importance in determining a wide range of 
behaviours, from risky sex to savings and investment to exercise and diet, with associated 
implications for the health and financial wellbeing of individuals and society. In economics, 
discussions about time preference can be traced back to models of savings, growth and 
development (Rae 1905; Samuelson 1937) and is even mentioned by Adam Smith in The 
Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776). Recently economists have begun to use both laboratory and 
small-scale field experiments to understand the determinants of time preference and the 
extent to which time preference affects decision-making in financial and other spheres 
(Akerlund et al 2014; Burks et al 2009; Carvalho et al 2014; Chang et al 2009; Meier and 
Sprenger 2010; Khwaja, et al 2007). In this article, we take a different approach and report 
on the determinants of inter-temporal choice from a large-scale field survey that was 
implemented to evaluate the Government of Kenya’s largest social protection programme, 
the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC).  
 
Individuals display significant variation in the weight they place on present versus future 
consumption and so understanding the role of demographic factors, particularly age, in 
determining inter-temporal choice is a key issue in the literature in this area (Bradford et al 
2014). Most studies argue that younger people are more impatient than adults (e.g Green et 
al 1999), with explanations about the myopia of youth related to their impulsivity (Whelan and 
McHugh 2009), their inability to make plans beyond today (Greene 1986) and their inability to 
foresee the future consequences of their actions (Grisso et al 2003). The contribution coming 
from other disciplines such as biology or neuro-economics enrich the explanations about 
preferences across the different age groups. According to Steinberg et al (2009: 40), the 
actions of younger people ‘are mediated by a ‘‘socioemotional’’ network’. People become 
more patient as they get older. They learn to control their impulses because their actions ‘are 
[now mainly] mediated by a ‘‘cognitive control’’ network’ (Steinberg et al, 2009: 40). 
Moreover, life events and experiences increase the salience and concreteness of people and 
shift their orientation from a short to a long-term perspective (Liu and Aaker 2007). 
Nonetheless, some authors argue that the relationship between age and the discount rate is 
not linear and that people in the middle-aged group are not only more patient than youths but 
they are also more patient than older adults (see Read and Read 2004; Chu et al 2008). 
Indeed, Sozou and Seymour (2003) argue that the transition to old age pushes up discount 
rate due to worsening health conditions and the decline in human fertility. Similarly, Trostel 
and Taylor (2001) explain that the elderly are more impatient because they have few years to 
live and so they feel more pressure to get satisfaction as soon as possible. 
 
Beyond age, a number of studies also focus on gender differences in time preferences. 
Almas et al. (2012) report no gender differences in a sample of Norwegian adolescents while 
Dittrich and Leipold (2014: 414) report that females are more willing to delay gratification 
than males in Germany due to their ability for self-regulation, created in part because ‘women 
spend more time in child care which requires them to delay their own gratification in order to 
put infants’ needs ahead of their own and which further requires them to resist distractions 
that separated them from their infants’. Bauer and Chytilová (2013) confirm that females are 
more patient than males using experimental data from Indian villages. They also refer to the 
link between women's patience and their child rearing, proposing that the presence of 
children in the household pushes mothers to delay present gratification and to care more 
about the future. Ashraf et al (2006) report that Filipino females are more patient than males 
and tend to be more dedicated to household savings while Ashrsaf (2009) confirms that 
females maintain control over household finances in the Philippines, which increases their 
responsibility for household living conditions and supports forward-looking behaviours. 
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Following this literature the present article explores the role of age, gender and income 
shocks (in the form of receipt of the CT-OVC benefit) on time discounting.  In particular, our 
work has two specific goals: we assess whether there are systematic differences in time 
discounting by age and gender, and then we explore heterogeneous programme effects by 
these characteristics. To do this – as explained above - we use experimental data collected 
as part of the impact evaluation of the Government of Kenya’s Cash Transfer for Orphans 
and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC), an unconditional cash transfer programme that reaches 
over 150,000 households across the country. We find that middle-aged individuals are more 
patient than younger and older adults, and in contrast to most of the previous evidence, 
females are less patient than males, with this gender difference particularly strong at younger 
ages. Our results also show that an unconditional cash transfer can affect inter-temporal 
choice, but the impacts vary strongly by age and gender. In particular, we find large and 
statistically significant effects among prime-age recipients and no effects on younger or older 
recipients, and programme impacts are stronger for females than males, an important result 
given that over 60 per cent of recipients in target households are females.  
 
This paper makes substantive as well as methodological contributions.  First, data is taken 
from a large-scale impact evaluation of an actual government cash transfer programme, the 
largest social protection programme in Kenya today, implying a high degree of external 
validity as most cash transfer programmes in Africa are unconditional and are similar to the 
Kenyan programme in terms of target group and design. Second, the paper adds new 
knowledge on the gender and age differences in time discounting. In addition, measuring the 
impact of a cash transfer programme on outcomes such as inter-temporal choice is quite 
new and we are aware of only two other studies along the same vein. Handa et al (2013) 
show that a national cash transfer programme in Zambia increases the propensity of poor 
participants to wait for future money, while Rubalcava et al (2009) report that Mexico’s 
PROGRESA programme promotes forward looking decision-making in recipient households 
headed by couples but not those headed by single females or single males. Finally, this 
paper is fundamentally different to the majority of work in this area in that it implements 
relatively simple questions, all hypothetical, in the context of a large multi-topic household 
survey. In a companion paper we report on the performance of these measures (Handa et al 
2014) and show that inconsistencies are remarkably low given the literacy and overall 
poverty level of the target group, and that measurement error is thus likely to be no worse 
than questions on income, consumption and labour supply that are now routine in multi-topic 
surveys such as the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS) and Living Standards Measurement Surveys. 
 
This paper is structured in the following way: Section 1 describes the Kenya Cash Transfer 
Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children; Section 2 discusses the data and 
empirical strategy; Section 3 reports the results of our analysis; and finally Section 4 
concludes. 
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1  The Kenya cash transfer programmes for 
orphans and vulnerable children1 
The aim of the Kenya CT-OVC is to protect orphans and other vulnerable children and 
encourage their human capital development. It is targeted to ultra-poor households (poorest 
20 per cent) that contain an orphan or vulnerable child (OVC) - i.e. a child with at least one 
deceased parent, or living with a main caregiver who is chronically ill. The programme was 
initially implemented as pilot in 2004 and then gradually expanded since 2007; today the 
Kenya CT-OVC reaches over 160,000 households, 350,000 OVC and is the country’s largest 
social protection programme. Participants receive US$25 (KES 2,000) per month (paid every 
two months) which represents approximately 20 per cent of beneficiary consumption. 
Similarly to other programmes implemented in Sub-Saharan African countries, the Kenya 
CT-OVC is unconditional, although caregivers are informed about the aim of the programme 
and their responsibilities towards the care and protection of the resident OVCs.  
 
The selection of participants is done in three stages2. First, a list of eligible households is 
prepared by an OVC Committee formed in each Location according to the demographic and 
poverty criteria. Second, the central office of the programme - located within the Ministry of 
Gender, Children and Social Development – assesses the eligibility criteria of the selected 
households and ranks them after administering an additional questionnaire with detailed 
socio-economic information. In the last stage, about 20 per cent of the poorest households 
that meet the eligibility are enrolled in each Location. When there are more eligible 
households than there is budget available, households are then ranked according to the age 
of the household head, resulting in a majority of elderly household heads receiving funds.  
 
2  Evaluation design, data and descriptive 
statistics 
2.1 Evaluation design 
Prior to programme expansion of the CT-OVC in 2007, Oxford Policy Management (OPM) 
was contracted by UNICEF to implement an impact evaluation to track the impact of the 
programme on the core indicators of household consumption and food security, child health, 
and schooling. The design entailed a cluster randomised longitudinal design with a baseline 
household survey conducted in 2007 and a 24 month follow-up in 2009. The ethical rationale 
for the design was that the programme could not expand to all eligible Locations at the same 
time, so Locations where entry would occur later in the expansion cycle could be used as 
control sites to measure the impact. In the seven districts across the country that were 
scheduled to enter the programme in 2007 (Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori, Suba, Nairobi, 
Garissa, and Kwale), four Locations were identified as eligible, two were randomised for 
immediate implementation, and the remaining two served as delayed entry control Locations. 
The targeting of households was carried out in all Locations and from the eligibility lists a 
sample of households was drawn, two-thirds from intervention Locations and the remaining 
third from control sites. Results from the impact evaluation have been reported by the Kenya 
CT-OVC Evaluation Team (2012a, b). In 2011 we returned to the households in the original 
evaluation sample that had been re-interviewed in 2009 and administered the same 
household survey along with a module covering preferences and expectations, administered 
                                                          
1
  The text for this section is based on Handa et al (2014). 
2
  Some revisions have been introduced but the overall targeting process remain the same. 
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to the main respondent. The 2011 study was approved by the University of North Carolina 
Institutional Review Board (UNC IRB) and the Kenya Medical Research Institute Ethics 
Review Committee.  
2.2 Attrition3 
The initial study period coincided with a time of political turmoil in Kenya resulting from the 
disputed national elections in December 2007. Over 1,000 people died and approximately 
400,000 people were internally displaced at this time. Consequently, attrition between the 
baseline and the first follow-up in 2009 was 17 per cent and concentrated in Kisumu and 
Nairobi, the two Locations in the study that experienced the most election-related unrest. 
Attrition between the 2009 and 2011 rounds was only 5 per cent. Table 2.1 shows that the 
means of selected demographic and poverty measures for households in each arm were 
stable across the three waves despite the relatively high attrition rate between 2007 and 
2009, indicating that the representativeness of the sample remained intact. 
 
A detailed analysis of attrition was conducted and reported in Handa et al (2014). That 
analysis shows that the probability of attriting was 19 and 9 percentage points higher for 
households in Nairobi and Kisumu respectively (the precise districts where election violence 
was most concentrated), and the determinants of attriting were the same across the two 
arms. The authors conclude, based on their analysis, that selective attrition is unlikely to be a 
concern in these data.  
2.3 Baseline balance 
The figures in bold in Table 2.1 indicate statistical significance between the intervention and 
the control arms of the study in each wave. The poverty-related variables are balanced 
across arms in each wave, but there are statistically significant differences in the age, sex 
and schooling levels of household heads across arms. This is due to the prioritisation 
process that occurred at the central Ministry because the number of households on the 
eligibility list typically exceeded the budget. This prioritisation process effectively gave the 
most weight to elderly-headed households. Since the final prioritisation process was not 
conducted in control Locations (as they were not scheduled to enter the programme 
immediately), households in the control arm of the study were drawn from a slightly larger 
eligibility list than those from the intervention arm, resulting in the differences in heads’ 
characteristics observed in Table 2.1. It is important to note however that there is no element 
of self-selection into the programme; household eligibility was completely supply-driven and 
take-up was universal.  
 
 
  
                                                          
3
  This section is based on Handa et al (2014). 
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Table 2.1 Household characteristics by wave and intervention status in the CT-OVC 
Evaluation Sample 
Sample: 2007 2009 2011 
T C T C T C 
Demographics       
Household size 5.48 5.79 5.54 5.81 5.53 5.82 
Residents 0-5 years 0.66 0.86 0.68 0.85 0.67 0.86 
Residents 6-11 years 1.21 1.33 1.23 1.32 1.23 1.31 
Residents 12-17 years 1.40 1.38 1.40 1.39 1.40 1.40 
Residents 18-45 years 1.12 1.45 1.13 1.46 1.13 1.46 
Residents 46-64 years 0.59 0.36 0.60 0.37 0.60 0.38 
Residents 65+ years 0.51 0.42 0.50 0.41 0.51 0.41 
Female head 0.65 0.57 0.65 0.59 0.65 0.59 
Age of head in years 62.34 56.06 62.21 56.20 62.55 56.55 
Head not completed primary 0.53 0.38 0.53 0.38 0.53 0.38 
Poverty       
Per adult equiv. monthly exp. (KES) 1533.30 1501.25 1541.77 1459.94 1550.14 1441.99 
Walls of mud/dung/grass/sticks 0.75 0.84 0.75 0.86 0.74 0.87 
Roof of mud/dung/grass/sticks 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 
Floor of mud/dung 0.66 0.74 0.65 0.77 0.66 0.79 
No toilet 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.56 
Unprotected water source 0.62 0.68 0.61 0.70 0.61 0.70 
Region       
Garissa 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.05 
Homa Bay 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 
Kisumu 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.22 
Kwale 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11 
Migori 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.26 
Nairobi 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.06 
Suba 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 
N 1540 754 1325 583 1266 545 
Statistically significant (at 10%) differences of t-test between Treatment (T) and Control (C) within each wave shown in bold. 
Thirty-three new households at follow-up not included in table. 
 
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
Inter-temporal decision-making is measured in the survey through a hypothetical question as 
follows: “Suppose that you suddenly win money in the Lotto. If you could choose between 
these payment options which do you choose?” Respondents were presented with six 
payment options and for each option the immediate monetary payment was KES 1,500, 
while the future payoffs were KES 1,250; 1,500; 3,000; 4,500; 7,000; and 9,000.4 In Figure 
2.2, we show the proportion of respondents that would wait for each value of future money. 
We also construct an ordinal variable classifying individuals by the value at which they would 
‘switch’, that is, that they move from not waiting to waiting for future money. This ranges from 
1 (most patient) to 7 (never switch); a value of 3 indicates for example that the individual 
switches at KES 3,000 (we refer to this variable as IES in the text below). As a further step, 
we build two dummy variables for ‘patient’ and ‘impatient’ participants that respectively 
                                                          
4
  The survey instrument is available at www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer/countries/kenya. The future amounts were not 
asked in this order—see instrument for exact ordering. 
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identify people willing to wait for payments lower than KES 3,000 and those who never 
accept to wait for future money. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, about 16 per cent of 
participants are impatient (IES = 7) since they “always” prefer to take money today. On the 
other hand, about 26 per cent of people are patient since they are willing to delay gratification 
even for a smaller reward (about 18 per cent). Moreover, we observe a jump in the 
percentage of people willing to delay gratification by 56 point (from 22 to 78 per cent) from a 
future value of KES 1,500 to KES 3,000 (Figure 2.2). Lastly, Figure 2.2 confirms that the 
share of participants willing to delay monetary gratification rises as the value of future 
monetary rewards increases. 
 
Figure 2.1 Individual switching points (IES)    
(1= patient; 7 = impatient) 
Figure 2.2 Per cent who will wait one month 
by future value 
 
 
As reported above, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that time discounting 
changes across age groups (Bishai 2004). In particular, inter-temporal choices ‘manifest 
[itself] in extremely different degrees in different individuals, and even in the same individual 
at different times’ (Bohm-Bawerk 1891, quoted in Becker and Mulligan 1997: 731 - 732). 
Figure 2.3 depicts the mean value of IES across the age distribution in our sample—the 
graph is U-shaped, declining from young to middle age and then rising toward old age. 
Young people are less patient than other groups reporting an IES index near 3.5 points 
though it is important to note that there are only 77 respondents under age 24 in the sample. 
Older adults (age 60 and above) report a mean IES index of 3.4 points while middle-aged 
adults are the most patient showing an IES index close to 3.1.  
 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
20
40
60
80
100
1
2
5
0
1
5
0
0
3
0
0
0
4
5
0
0
7
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
  
12 
 
Figure 2.3 Impatience by age 
 
 
As reported in the literature, our data also shows gender differences (Figure 2.4). Although 
the IES index is U-shaped for both groups, changes across the ages seem less evident for 
females than for males. Moreover, females are less patient than males during young and 
adult life. However, Figure 2.4 shows that females become more patient than males during 
old age.  
 
Figure 2.4 Impatience by age and sex 
 
 
Comparing the treated and the control group, Table 2.2 shows that the mean differences are 
smaller than one percentage point for payments lower than KES 3,000, while they range 
between 3.4 and 4.4 points for the remaining payment choices. The mean difference 
between the two groups is smaller than one point for the IES index, but the control group is  
3 percentage points more likely to never wait for money (last row of Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2 Mean differences in per cent willing to wait by study arm and 
amount 
 
T C p-value difference in 
means 
Wait for 1250 19.1 19.5 0.84 
Wait for 1500 26.4 26.3 0.96 
Wait for 3000 78.4 75.0 0.13 
Wait for 4500 81.1 77.5 0.09 
Wait for 7000 83.1 78.7 0.03 
Wait for 9000 83.1 79.6 0.09 
IES 3.2 3.3 0.14 
1 if wait for 1250 or 1500 31.8 32.3 0.85 
1 if never wait 16.0 19.2 0.11 
N 1280 525 
 
Control group mean weighted using the Inverse Probability Weight 
 
Figure 2.5 traces the mean value of IES by age group for the two study arms. While the 
overall difference in means is not statistically different (Table 2.2), Figure 2.5 suggests that 
there may be differences in programme effects by age group, particularly at middle and older 
ages. 
 
Figure 2.5 Impatience by age (local polynomial fit) 
 
Figure 2.6 and 2.7 show local linear regression (lowess) estimates of the dummy variable for 
‘impatience’ (never waiting for future money) by age and gender for each study arm. These 
figures confirm that people in the middle age group are more patient than others. However 
they also show that  males in the treated group are always more patient than those in the 
control group, while for females the differences appear to interact with age, with large 
potential treatment effects between ages 30-50 and then later in life.  
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Figure 2.6 Impatience by age: female (local 
polynomial fit) 
Figure 2.7 Impatience by age: male (local 
polynomial fit) 
3  The impact of the programme on time 
discounting 
 
3.1 The empirical strategy 
To assess the impact of the programme on inter-temporal choice we estimate model 1 which 
expresses individual preferences (y) as a function of different individual and household 
characteristics, respectively identified with i and h subscript variables. In the former group we 
include age, education, health status and sex while in the latter we include household size, 
demographic composition, per capita consumption expenditure, housing characteristics and 
the district of residence; all control variables are measured at baseline values. We capture 
the impact of the programme through a dummy variable (T) that takes the value 1 if the 
respondent lives in a treatment household. 
 
 = 	 +		
 +	 +	
 +	 (1) 
 
As reported above, our hypothesis is that the programme has heterogeneous effects by ages 
and gender. Thus – in a first stage - we test the impact of the programme on three ages 
groups, i.e. young (aged less than 25 years old), adult (aged 25 – 59) and older adult (aged 
more than 59). Then we separate our sample by gender and interact the age group dummies 
with the indicator for treatment status. 
  
Recall that there were small differences in demographic characteristics of household heads 
between treatment and control arms due to the fact that the control households were 
sampled from the full eligibility list while treatment households were sampled from the 
prioritised list. We address this using inverse probability weights (IPW) derived from a 
regression that predicts the likelihood of treatment given a vector of household and individual 
characteristics. Given the importance of age in the prioritisation process this regression is 
close to saturated in age and results are shown in the Appendix, as is the distribution of the 
probability of being treated weighted by the IPW. Table 3.1 shows the mean characteristics 
of the control group after applying the IPW—these are now much more aligned to those of 
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the treatment group. We continue to explicitly control for these covariates (measured at the 
baseline) in our regression estimates.   
Table 3.1 Mean characteristics of respondents of behavioural module 
 
T C (unweighted) C (weighted) p-value difference (1) vs. (3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age in years 57.3 49.2 59.1 0.03 
Female 79.3 72.2 77.3 0.57 
Partner in household 34.5 40.4 33.5 0.68 
Can read 29.9 44.0 29.9 0.91 
Chronically ill (baseline)1 14.9 14.1 17.8 0.14 
Disabled (baseline)1 6.3 4.0 6.3 0.98 
N 1280 525 525 
 
1/ Self-reported. Estimates in column (3) weighted by inverse probability weight. 
3.2 The impact of the programme on time discounting: full sample 
Table 3.2 reports the regression results from estimating model (1). None of the coefficients 
for the treatment effect are statistically significant indicating that receipt of the cash transfer 
does not affect time discounting in the full sample. However, there are some interesting 
results related to age, education, disability and the presence of a partner in the household. 
The age coefficients are negative and statistically significant for payments higher than KES 
3,000 while illiterate and disabled people are less willing to wait for future payments than 
others.  
Table 3.2 Determinants of time discounting with inverse probability weights 
  Is willing to wait one month for KES:   
wait9000 wait7000 wait4500 wait3000 wait1500 IES Impatient1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
T 0.0336 0.0418 0.0361 0.0360 0.00565 -0.156 -0.0297 
(1.31) (1.60) (1.35) (1.30) (0.20) (-1.21) (-1.17) 
Age -0.00261 -0.00272 -0.00207 -0.00148 0.000771 0.00754 0.00236 
(-2.66) (-2.76) (-2.07) (-1.42) (0.79) (1.54) (2.44) 
Female 0.0375 0.0233 0.0259 0.0357 -0.0535 -0.109 -0.0375 
(0.93) (0.59) (0.62) (0.87) (-1.39) (-0.54) (-0.94) 
Has partner -0.0296 -0.0179 -0.0266 -0.0184 -0.0717 0.147 0.0145 
(-0.98) (-0.58) (-0.80) (-0.55) (-1.98) (0.97) (0.49) 
Can read 0.0674 0.0628 0.0579 0.0785 0.0377 -0.374 -0.0612 
(2.19) (2.07) (1.86) (2.40) (0.99) (-2.35) (-2.02) 
Has chronic 
illness 0.00530 0.0106 0.0276 0.0409 0.0116 -0.0994 -0.000732 
(0.13) (0.25) (0.66) (0.96) (0.26) (-0.48) (-0.02) 
Disabled -0.150 -0.156 -0.145 -0.145 -0.0929 0.816 0.163 
(-1.80) (-1.87) (-1.72) (-1.70) (-1.70) (2.12) (1.95) 
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 
R-squared 0.079 0.081 0.075 0.082 0.058 0.079 0.080 
Notes: Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights. Also included in model 
but not reported are indicators for district, rural residence, log household size, number of residents in each of six age categories, 
quality of roof, floor, walls, toilet facility,  type of cooking fuel used, electricity, crowding index, and baseline per capita household 
consumption expenditure. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 5 per cent. 1/ Will never wait for any amount offered.  
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3.3 The impact of the programme on time discounting across age groups 
Our main hypothesis is that the programme has heterogeneous effects by age and gender. 
Thus – in this section – we test the impact of the programme on time discounting by age 
groups. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) regression estimates of 
treatment effects on young people aged less than 25 years old are shown in Table 3.3. 
Treatment status coefficients are large (16 percentage points) for higher payment values but 
not statistically significant, likely due to the small sample size in this age group. Although this 
small sample, coefficients for education are statistically significant at high future values—
literate respondents are more likely to wait for future money. 
Table 3.3 Determinants of time discounting with inverse probability weights: people 
aged less than 25 years old 
  Is willing to wait one month for KES:   
 
wait9000 wait7000 wait4500 wait3000 wait1500 IES Impatient1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
       
T -0.160 -0.160 -0.0429 -0.203 0.0409 0.710 0.160 
(-1.52) (-1.52) (-0.34) (-1.65) (0.37) (1.36) (1.52) 
Age -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0115 -0.0238 0.00886 0.0420 0.0124 
(-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.44) (-1.05) (0.30) (0.42) (0.65) 
Female 0.0273 0.0273 0.0261 0.0977 0.0976 -0.405 -0.0273 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.82) (0.83) (-0.73) (-0.22) 
Has partner -0.128 -0.128 -0.137 -0.124 -0.223 0.886 0.128 
(-1.09) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-0.99) (-1.86) (1.58) (1.09) 
Can read 0.248 0.248 -0.0239 0.185 -0.238 -0.550 -0.248 
(2.45) (2.45) (-0.18) (1.84) (-1.50) (-1.05) (-2.45) 
Has chronic 
illness 0.214 0.214 0.371 0.0569 0.233 -2.003 -0.214 
(1.20) (1.20) (1.60) (0.28) (1.49) (-2.16) (-1.20) 
Disabled 0.298 0.298 0.0650 0.325 0.184 -0.552 -0.298 
 
(1.01) (1.01) (0.13) (1.06) (0.78) (-0.35) (-1.01) 
        
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.478 0.478 0.488 0.520 0.367 0.475 0.478 
Notes: Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights. Also included in model 
but not reported are indicators for district, rural residence, log household size, number of residents in each of six age categories, 
quality of roof, floor, walls, toilet facility,  type of cooking fuel used, electricity, crowding index, and baseline per capita household 
consumption expenditure. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 5 per cent. 1/ Will never wait for any amount offered 
 
Table 3.4 shows the impact of the programme on time discounting for people aged 26 – 59 
years old. In contrast to the previous case, people in the treated group are more willing to 
wait for future values higher than KES 1,500. In particular, treatment status coefficients are 
positive - ranging around 7 and 8 points - and statistically significant at the highest future 
values. Similarly, the treatment effect is negative and significant for the impatience dummy 
and the impatience index (where higher values indicate impatience). Looking to the other 
variables, literacy again increases the likelihood of delaying payment while disability and sex 
of respondent are not related to discounting in this age group.        
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Table 3.4 Determinants of time discounting with inverse probability weights: people 
aged 25-59 years old 
  Is willing to wait one month for KES:   
 
wait9000 wait7000 wait4500 wait3000 wait1500 IES Impatient1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (9) 
              
T 0.0724 0.0826 0.0688 0.0694 0.0470 -0.357 -0.0635 
(2.28) (2.54) (2.02) (1.95) (1.37) (-2.25) (-2.00) 
Age -0.00206 -0.00268 -0.00223 -0.00142 0.00354 0.00651 0.00250 
(-1.25) (-1.63) (-1.28) (-0.78) (1.96) (0.82) (1.53) 
Female -0.0318 -0.0316 -0.0441 0.00366 -0.0427 0.0435 0.0172 
(-0.76) (-0.75) (-0.97) (0.07) (-0.90) (0.20) (0.41) 
Has partner -0.0474 -0.0170 -0.0445 -0.000511 -0.0174 0.00659 0.0207 
(-1.49) (-0.52) (-1.20) (-0.01) (-0.47) (0.04) (0.66) 
Can read 0.0709 0.0655 0.0680 0.0827 0.0138 -0.330 -0.0661 
(2.02) (1.88) (1.89) (2.21) (0.37) (-1.96) (-1.89) 
Has chronic illness 0.0196 0.0311 0.0459 0.0642 0.0421 -0.199 -0.0211 
(0.44) (0.68) (1.01) (1.36) (0.89) (-0.91) (-0.47) 
Disabled -0.113 -0.122 -0.119 -0.100 -0.0347 0.573 0.126 
 
(-1.20) (-1.31) (-1.26) (-1.06) (-0.43) (1.25) (1.36) 
        
Observations 975 975 975 975 975 975 975 
R-squared 0.113 0.110 0.093 0.103 0.070 0.091 0.097 
Notes: Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights. Also included in model 
but not reported are indicators for district, rural residence, log household size, number of residents in each of six age categories, 
quality of roof, floor, walls, toilet facility,  type of cooking fuel used, electricity, crowding index, and baseline per capita household 
consumption expenditure. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 5 per cent. 1/ Will never wait for any amount offered 
 
Finally, Table 3.5 reports the impact of the programme on time discounting for people older 
than 59 years old. None of the treatment effects are statistically significant in this sub-sample 
thus the cash payments have no effects on time discounting for elderly people. Interestingly 
in this sample neither literacy nor disability status have an impact on time discounting.  
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Table 3.5 Determinants of time discounting with inverse probability weights: people 
aged more than 59 years old 
  Is willing to wait one month for KES:   
wait9000 wait7000 wait4500 wait3000 wait1500 IES Impatient1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (9) 
              
T 0.0268 0.0364 0.0322 0.0363 -0.0184 -0.104 -0.0248 
(0.68) (0.92) (0.81) (0.88) (-0.41) (-0.53) (-0.65) 
Age -0.00422 -0.00466 -0.00469 -0.00382 -0.00199 0.0219 0.00366 
(-1.32) (-1.44) (-1.45) (-1.16) (-0.50) (1.31) (1.15) 
Female 0.0391 0.000265 -0.000628 -0.00352 -0.126 0.175 -0.0240 
(0.46) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-1.71) (0.40) (-0.29) 
Has partner -0.0500 -0.0688 -0.0748 -0.0865 -0.181 0.628 0.0557 
(-0.79) (-1.06) (-1.16) (-1.32) (-2.31) (1.92) (0.88) 
Can read 0.0159 0.00542 0.000266 0.0313 0.0670 -0.329 -0.0119 
(0.26) (0.09) (0.00) (0.52) (0.85) (-1.01) (-0.20) 
Has chronic illness -0.0268 -0.0272 -0.0161 -0.00450 -0.0187 0.147 0.0313 
(-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.24) (-0.07) (-0.28) (0.46) (0.47) 
Disabled -0.205 -0.209 -0.193 -0.198 -0.150 1.076 0.219 
 
(-1.56) (-1.64) (-1.47) (-1.50) (-2.14) (1.95) (1.71) 
Observations 753 753 753 753 753 753 753 
R-squared 0.122 0.129 0.134 0.124 0.097 0.130 0.131 
Notes: Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights. Also included in model 
but not reported are indicators for district, rural residence, log household size, number of residents in each of six age categories, 
quality of roof, floor, walls, toilet facility,  type of cooking fuel used, electricity, crowding index, and baseline per capita household 
consumption expenditure. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 5 per cent. 1/ Will never wait for any amount offered 
 
3.4 The impact of the programme on time discounting by ages and gender  
Given the lowess graphs presented earlier it appears as if there may be different treatment 
effects by age and gender and so in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 we display results by gender and 
interact the treatment dummy with age group to test for heterogeneous treatment effects by 
age-gender. In this framework, the treatment dummy measures the treatment effect among 
the youngest age group (the excluded or reference group). Within the treatment group, age 
differences in treatment effects are given by the sum of the respective age dummy and 
interaction term. Within each age group, differences across study arms are given by the sum 
of the treatment dummy and the respective age-interaction term. 
 
For males (Table 3.6), neither treatment nor age dummy coefficients nor their interactions 
are statistically significant. This suggests that for men, the treatment effect is stable across 
the age-profile. However, there is a larger strong effect of literacy among men, with those 
who can read about 12 points more likely to wait for future money relative to those who 
cannot.   
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Table 3.6 Determinants of time discounting with inverse probability weights: males 
  Is willing to wait one month for KES:   
wait9000 wait7000 wait4500 wait3000 wait1500 IES Impatient1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (9) 
                
T 0.0599 0.0501 0.223 0.0282 -0.186 -0.0174 -0.0492 
(0.43) (0.35) (1.31) (0.17) (-1.05) (-0.03) (-0.34) 
Age 25-59 years -0.118 -0.117 0.0820 -0.125 -0.0875 0.436 0.111 
(-0.91) (-0.88) (0.51) (-0.86) (-0.52) (0.71) (0.83) 
T*Age 25-59 years 0.0675 0.0666 -0.110 0.0788 0.226 -0.554 -0.0636 
(0.44) (0.42) (-0.60) (0.44) (1.21) (-0.77) (-0.40) 
Age 60+ years -0.137 -0.111 0.0819 -0.0606 0.0848 -0.147 0.104 
(-0.89) (-0.71) (0.45) (-0.37) (0.40) (-0.18) (0.67) 
T*Age 60+ years 0.0409 0.00796 -0.180 -0.00767 0.0132 0.218 -0.0127 
(0.25) (0.05) (-0.94) (-0.04) (0.06) (0.27) (-0.08) 
Has partner 0.102 0.125 0.146 0.172 -0.00963 -0.597 -0.129 
(1.59) (1.98) (2.30) (2.72) (-0.14) (-1.81) (-2.05) 
Can read 0.137 0.122 0.115 0.122 0.104 -0.684 -0.128 
(2.59) (2.38) (2.10) (2.29) (1.57) (-2.44) (-2.52) 
Has chronic illness -0.0621 -0.0667 -0.0497 -0.00251 0.0619 0.196 0.0716 
(-0.84) (-0.91) (-0.68) (-0.03) (0.80) (0.50) (0.98) 
Disabled -0.0942 -0.124 -0.117 -0.0959 -0.113 0.782 0.129 
(-0.84) (-1.10) (-1.00) (-0.84) (-1.31) (1.58) (1.15) 
Observations 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 
R-squared 0.239 0.237 0.223 0.227 0.113 0.220 0.248 
Notes: Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights. Also included in model 
but not reported are indicators for district, rural residence, log household size, number of residents in each of six age categories, 
quality of roof, floor, walls, toilet facility,  type of cooking fuel used, electricity, crowding index, and baseline per capita household 
consumption expenditure. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 5 per cent. 1/ Will never wait for any amount offered 
 
For women on the other hand, there appear to be strong heterogeneous treatment effects by 
age (Table 3.7) with all age and age-interaction terms statistically significant for outcomes 
other than KES 1,500.  The sign patterns and magnitudes suggest that prime-age and older 
adults in the treatment group are the most patient. For example, prime-age women in the 
treatment group are 12.2 percentage points more likely to wait for KES 9,000 relative to 
young women (-0.198 + 0.320) and older women are 0.038 percentage points more likely to 
wait for the same amount (-0.213 + 0.251).  Table 3.8 calculates the mean difference in the 
likelihood of waiting for different values based on the coefficients in Table 3.7 for ease of 
reference. The largest mean differences are found between middle and younger age women 
in the treatment group, with mean differences ranging from 12 to 22 percentage points (for 
KES 4,500). And the treatment effect is also largest among middle age women, ranging from 
6-7 percentage points (column 3 of Table 3.8). The age effects within the treatment arm tend 
to be larger than the treatment effects within each age group. For example, in the prime age 
group, women in the treatment group are only 7 points more likely to wait for KES 7,000 
relative to women in this age group in the control arm (column 3 of Table 3.8); however, 
within the treatment group middle-age women are 12 points more likely to wait for KES 7,000 
compared to younger women. Overall these results confirm that treatment effect of the CT-
OVC appears to be largest among middle-age women, and among women in general. In 
particular, middle-age women are more patient followed by older and then younger women. 
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Table 3.7 Determinants of time discounting with inverse probability weights, females 
  Is willing to wait one month for KES:   
wait9000 wait7000 wait4500 wait3000 wait1500 IES Impatient1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (9) 
                
T -0.260 -0.265 -0.387 -0.309 0.0557 1.754 0.247 
(-3.14) (-3.18) (-4.21) (-3.47) (0.63) (2.86) (3.01) 
Age 25-59 years -0.198 -0.218 -0.226 -0.246 0.0944 1.302 0.171 
(-3.90) (-4.03) (-4.23) (-4.39) (1.41) (2.44) (3.46) 
T*Age 25-59 years 0.320 0.336 0.447 0.368 -0.0208 -2.030 -0.300 
(3.48) (3.59) (4.43) (3.73) (-0.22) (-3.15) (-3.28) 
Age 60+ years -0.213 -0.231 -0.245 -0.250 0.0902 1.401 0.189 
(-3.57) (-3.81) (-3.98) (-3.82) (1.17) (2.48) (3.25) 
T*Age 60+ years 0.251 0.274 0.395 0.319 -0.0577 -1.840 -0.246 
(2.63) (2.84) (3.79) (3.12) (-0.59) (-2.80) (-2.60) 
Has partner -0.0521 -0.0418 -0.0609 -0.0577 -0.0975 0.348 0.0395 
(-1.52) (-1.16) (-1.63) (-1.50) (-2.34) (2.00) (1.17) 
Can read 0.0599 0.0603 0.0553 0.0745 0.00139 -0.308 -0.0516 
(1.60) (1.62) (1.47) (1.90) (0.03) (-1.59) (-1.39) 
Has chronic illness 0.0302 0.0396 0.0507 0.0589 0.00234 -0.220 -0.0317 
(0.78) (1.01) (1.30) (1.43) (0.05) (-1.14) (-0.82) 
Disabled -0.210 -0.210 -0.199 -0.210 -0.0805 0.981 0.217 
(-1.84) (-1.82) (-1.74) (-1.78) (-1.11) (1.86) (1.90) 
Observations 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 
R-squared 0.075 0.072 0.074 0.077 0.067 0.078 0.074 
 
Notes: Linear probability OLS regressions with robust standard errors and inverse probability weights. Also included in model 
but not reported are indicators for district, rural residence, log household size, number of residents in each of six age categories, 
quality of roof, floor, walls, toilet facility,  type of cooking fuel used, electricity, crowding index, and baseline per capita household 
consumption expenditure. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 5 per cent. 1/ Will never wait for any amount offered 
 
Table 3.8 Mean differences in effects derived from coefficients in Table 3.7 
(percentage points) 
 Within treatment group Difference between T vs C 
 Difference between (<25) 
and (25-59) 
Difference between (<25) 
and (60+) 
Age group 25-59 Age group 60+ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Delay amount (KES)     
3000 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.01 
4500 0.22 0.15 0.06 0.01 
7000 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.01 
9000 0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.01 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the role of age, gender and income shocks on time discounting using 
evaluation data from the Government of Kenya’s largest social protection programme, the 
Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC).  
 
First, the analysis confirms that young people are less patient than other age groups. This is 
consistent with the theoretical literature that suggests that younger people are more 
impulsive and have greater difficulty making plans or foreseeing the consequences of their 
actions in the future. They become more patient as they get older and their cognitive control 
dominates their emotions. Yet, people become more impatient in old age because of the 
growing uncertainty about their life and the increasing pressure to obtain satisfaction as soon 
as possible. Second, this paper shows important gender differences in time discounting. In 
contrast to previous empirical evidence, females in our study population are less patient than 
males during young and middle-ages but become more patient relative men at older age. 
Third, we show that a national poverty targeted cash transfer affects time discounting among 
women but not men, an important result given that about two-thirds of beneficiary household 
heads are women in this programme. Moreover, treatment effects are highest among women 
age 25-59, followed by those age 60 and above.  
 
These results are exciting in that they derive from a national cash transfer programme that is 
currently being taken to scale by the government of Kenya. The parameters of the Kenyan 
programme are similar to other national programmes in Eastern and Southern Africa 
suggesting an important degree of external validity. The results depict that policies for equity 
may also provide important efficiency benefits as well. In our specific setting, the Kenya CT-
OVC helps protect the most vulnerable groups in the short term by improving food security 
and consumption (Kenya CT-OVC Study Team 2012a); at the same time, the programme  
appears to promote forward looking decision-making  with potentially important 
consequences in terms of investment in human capital and other investment.  
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Annex 1 
 
Annex 1 Probit estimates of probability of being in treatment group 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Female 0.0413 0.0312 
Partner in household -0.0262 0.0283 
Able to read -0.0246 0.0277 
Chronic illness  -0.00150 0.0325 
Disabled 0.0729 0.0418 
Rural area 0.242 0.0594 
Per capita consumption (x10000) -0.0111 0.027 
Residents age 0-5 -0.00576 0.0305 
Residents age 6-11 0.00601 0.0298 
Residents age 12-17 0.00637 0.0290 
Residents age 18-45 -0.0817 0.0503 
Residents age 46-64 0.121 0.0686 
Residents age 65+ 0.0214 0.0376 
Log household size -0.00398 0.128 
Crowding -0.0113 0.00842 
Walls of mud/dung/grass/sticks -0.120 0.0387 
Roof of mud/dung/grass/sticks 0.0188 0.0394 
Floor of mud -0.0479 0.0362 
Cooking fuel biomass 0.250 0.0586 
Electricity -0.0730 0.0778 
No toilet -0.00278 0.0264 
Nairobi 0.234 0.0503 
Homa Bay -0.333 0.0868 
Migori -0.335 0.0843 
Kisumu -0.360 0.0856 
Suba -0.269 0.0876 
Kwale -0.201 0.0891 
Age <30 -0.128 0.0651 
Age 31-40 -0.345 0.0651 
Age 41-45 -0.359 0.0730 
Age 46-50 -0.190 0.0675 
Age 51-55 -0.151 0.0626 
Age 56-60 -0.105 0.0581 
Age 61-65 -0.0284 0.0564 
Age 66-75 0.0132 0.0469 
Residents age 18-45*residents 46-64 0.0238 0.0198 
Household size*residents 18-45 0.00597 0.00342 
Household size*residents 46-64 -0.00710 0.00946 
Log likelihood -916.14 
Chi square (38) 292.2 
Psuedo R-square 0.16 
Observations 1,805 
Estimates are used to derive probability scores for inverse probability weight calculation. See text for explanation. 
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Annex 2 
 
Annex 2 Distribution of probability scores 
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